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Abstract
This critical ethnography explores a social justice program utilizing nontraditional, democratic,
“experiential” education practices. The author posits a historical legacy of pedagogy of self obscures
its emancipatory, democratic potential while simultaneously expanding on contemporary discourses
of self and other as aspects of the educational setting. Students’ labors to reference and enact oppressive, capitalistic idealizations of either self or other problematizes pragmatic theories of self, and the
author draws upon critical pragmatism to reposition self and other as aspects of pedagogy and curriculum in democratic education.
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I

n her historical critique of experiential learning
theory, Michelson (1999) considered the isolation of
self-as-learner paranoid of outside influence—what she
called the “privatizing of body and mind” (p. 140)—to be the
primary pitfall of the post-Enlightenment experiential learning
(EL) movement. Such isolation, wherein learners are encouraged to
individually and internally construct personally useful knowledge
from an external, asocial environment such as that promoted
within learning cycles literature (e.g., Kolb, 1984), is argued to
hamper democratic participation by adopting isolated, cognitivist
approaches to learning and growth (Vernon, 2013, 2014). Some
form of this conversation of the isolated learner and subsequent
issues with democratic learning has been recurring in experiential
learning theory for over a decade (e.g., Fenwick, 2001; Miettinen,
2000; Seaman & Nelsen, 2011; Vernon, 2013), yet surprisingly little
systematic research has been accomplished that looks into the
democracy & education, vol 23, n-o 2

particulars of the potential for educational programming drawing
on EL theory to set the conditions for an interdependent, democratic learning environment (see also Rheingold, 2012; Seaman &
Rheingold, 2013; Vernon, 2014). In this paper, I present data and
analyses from my own research, adding to this literature. In tandem
with a decade of scholarly critique, my interactions with
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experiential educators throughout this research indicated that
most were largely unaware of theoretical work in EL outside of or
beyond learning cycles discourses (see also Miettinen, 2000;
Seaman, 2008), pointing to a need to intersect substantive,
interactional research on democratic learning with contemporary
practices among EL communities while maintaining an active
connection with a literature that does not appear to have become
practically dated, despite some academic pleas to render it so (e.g.,
Miettinen, 2000; Vernon, 2013).
In this paper I employ a critical, shifting text (Babich, 1994) to
entwine genres and present my own ethnographic research and
analyses regarding a contemporary—and on many levels commendable, though here I focus on a problematic fixture—educational
program influenced by EL. From June through August of 2013, I
joined an American-style Outward Bound school (A-OB) as an
ethnographer to study both the organization and a unique, experiential education (EE) setting: what I am titling the Diversity Program,
a cluster of courses partnered with public school systems in one
particular state aimed at creating a democratic setting of “a learning
culture within which issues of diversity and social justice can be
positively addressed” (American Outward Bound [A-OB], n.d.).
When analyzing data from the study, self and other arose as central
concepts for addressing the question of democratic education within
this contemporary example of EE, which draws on EL theory—
particularly within individual-constructivist traditions (e.g., Kolb,
1984)—for curricular and pedagogical direction; these concepts of
self and other will be the primary mode through which I hope to
unwarp a discussion of (un)democratic learning activity which
pushes out from discussions of the “isolated self.”
My ethnographic relationship with A-OB and the Diversity
Program had three distinct stages: First, I quite literally lived in
the A-OB administrative offices of the school, sleeping on the
floor at night, where I collected and analyzed documents from
the library and Diversity Program files and interviewed and
observed administrative staff; second, I was embedded within a
co-instructor team for 12 days as an observer and peripheral
participant while the two co-educators planned, ran, and
wrapped up a Diversity Course; and third, I traveled to the city
where the nine Diversity students were from to meet with them
as well as to interview the staff who oversaw the public school’s
commitment to the program. Throughout my study, the
primary question driving my research was: In what manners
can EL–inspired education, and more specifically outdoor
adventure–based experiential education (OEE), act as a site for
education for democracy? My primary interactions with the
Diversity Program research participants concluded in the
spring of 2014; this paper reports on data from the summer of
2013 and focuses specifically on a key aspect of the course
curriculum and pedagogy that played a central role in their
interactions, and which raises perspectives germane to discourses of self and critiques of isolation in EL theory: the
organizationally idealized education of self/other generations
and interactions among participants.
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Outward Bound and Self
The United States’ Outward Bound schools began in 1962 to
provide outdoor adventure–based, experiential programming to
the American public, such as school systems, camps, and
communities, as well as the global public through open-
enrollment programs (A-OB, n.d.; Miner & Boldt, 2002) within
the wild areas of the country. The particular A-OB school I
studied is a charter member of the larger Outward Bound
International (OBI), which is made up of a collection of Outward
Bound schools in over forty countries around the world; the
United States alone is now home to dozens of Outward Bound
schools offering educational programming to diverse student
groups in both urban and wilderness settings.
Outward Bound originated in the United Kingdom during
World War II as the brainchild of businessman Lawrence Holt and
educator Kurt Hahn (Miner & Boldt, 2002). The earliest schools
used a mixture of outdoor adventure with “a reasonable element of
danger” (Hahn, 1949), such as sailing or mountaineering coupled
with rescue training, to encourage young males toward a holistic
and nationalistic passion for Christian service (Hahn, 1949, p. 8).
Hahn’s educational philosophy was a hybridization of Romance-
inspired Allgemeinbildung (Klafki, 2000; Rohrs, 1966); the
conservative and sexually repressive pedagogy of British educator
Cecil Reddie (Darling, 1981; Hahn, 1949); and the aristocratic
politics of a 19th-century Enlightenment interpretation of Platonic
philosophy (e.g., Hahn, 1934; see also van Oord, 2010; Worsley,
1985). It should also be no surprise that Hahn, who was born into
an aristocratic German family and raised in both British and
German school systems, should show the influences of both
educational traditions.
Whilst little discussed in English-speaking academic
circles, the German educational philosophy of Bildung is ubiquitous throughout central Europe (Westbury, 2000). Lacking a
direct translation, the concept—of which there are many iterations throughout nearly three centuries of literature—deals with
the self-origination and growth of an individual-in-culture in
such a manner as to develop and use one’s intelligence to benefit
humanity (Klafki, 2000; Lüth, 2000). Whereas Bildung is
sometimes organized into specific subject matter, Allgemeinbildung can be thought of as a general, or whole-curriculum,
Bildung, through which individuals work to develop the possibilities of their full human powers in manners that directly
impact culture and society (Klafki, 2000). Hahn, when translating his pedagogy for an English audience, used the term grande
passion (Hahn, 1934, 1949) to articulate this self-originating
power, and felt that a student’s manifestation of a grande passion
should mark the development of a curriculum around the child.
To illustrate, in addresses and speeches he often referenced
students who, under his care, would discover an innate, grande
passion for a particular human discipline, such as art or medicine, and the indelible impact on local and national societies
these students went on to have (e.g., Hahn, 1949, 1960).
Children’s energies through which they could discover and
commit to a grande passion, in Hahn’s view, were unfortunately
short-lived and easily corruptible. Situated within the Romantic
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movement (see also Darling, 1981), Hahn feared that society and
civilization had a nefarious influence on young boys during
adolescence. He argued:
Where the public school fails is in the protection of adolescence;
loyalties draw their vitality from an intact inner strength . . . it can
survive adolescence, but only on one condition, if on the threshold of
puberty, healthgiving [sic] passions are stirred. (Hahn, 1949, pp. 4–5)

That is, Hahn felt that the innate purity of young males’ passions
were corrupted by sexual development if allowed to occur
within a sexualized society; removal to an ‘innocent’ setting—
such as the ocean or mountainside, coupled with physical
exercise to further delay puberty—would allow for the passionate loyalties necessary for a lifelong Allgemeinbildung to
crystalize. Left in civilization, Hahn feared young boys would be
left “at the mercy of impulses that well up during puberty and
which impatiently and insidiously struggle for satisfaction”
(Hahn, 1949, p. 5); Outward Bound offered an “island of
healing” (Hahn, 1949, p. 6), isolating young boys long enough to
hopefully “[re-]assemble the dispersed soul of the modern
young” (Hahn, 1949, p. 8). This cultural organization of selfhood, what I am describing as the intersubjectively idealized
symbolic spaces and places an individual is socially referenced
to and constrained by—whom I will refer to as the inherent
self—was to be drawn out via a holistic curriculum and bolstered by an educational system toward a lifelong movement of
human completeness. The inherent self can be thought of as one
of the first iterations within this particular educational lineage.
These retreats to the outdoors as an escape from society and
sexual development was not new during early 20th century British
education (or American; see Armstrong, 1990), although his direct
tie to theories of Bildung made for a unique pedagogy of self.
Reddie’s tenure as headmaster at the private boarding school
Abbotsholme was marked by a similar Romantic-era belief
structure (Darling, 1981), and it was a book about Reddie and
Abbotsholme that sparked Hahn to give up his studies to be an art
historian and instead move into education (van Oord, 2010).
However, Reddie, like much the rest of the Western English-
speaking world at the time, drew from a view of self as something to
be molded or instilled from the outside (Campbell, 1987; Freeman,
2010; Michelson, 1999). This cultural organization of self, whom I
am referring to as the instilled self, was philosophically challenged
by the Enlightenment and Romantic periods (Michelson, 1999) and
not necessarily in line with Hahn’s Germanic educational philosophy, but the patriotic and religious institutional structuring of
Western cultures maintained the instilled self as the dominant
educational perspective into the mid-20th century (Armstrong,
1990; Campbell, 1987). Thus, it is possible to describe Hahn’s work
as a bringing together of various educational traditions during a
time where cultural norms regarding a pedagogy of self were
likewise shifting toward something like—but not the same as—an
inherent self, and this may have made Hahn’s work appear more
progressive within the educational system than it was (see also
Worsley, 1985).
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Hahn’s work in this area was delayed by his service in World
War I, but after the war ended, he quickly began a private school that
tested his educational philosophy. Hahn’s first school venture was
funded by Maximilian Alexander Friedrich Wilhelm, Prince of
Baden, the last Imperial Chancellor of the German Empire, and for
whom Hahn was the private secretary (Miner & Boldt, 2002;
van Oord, 2010). This was the Schule Schloss Salem, founded in 1920
in Salem, Germany; the school, fitting Hahn’s Platonic leanings and
longstanding relationships with European aristocracy, was designed
to attract the future generations of ruling elite (van Oord, 2010;
Worsley, 1985). Among the school’s notable alumni were members
of European royal families, children of military leaders, and the
children of prominent scholars, authors, actors, and business
executives, and although briefly closed during World War II, it
reopened in 1945 and remains one of the most elite boarding schools
in Europe (Schule Schloss Salem, n.d.).
After the then-Jewish Hahn (he converted to Christianity later
in life) immigrated to Scotland from Nazi-controlled Germany in
June of 1933—the stories of this process are both oft-repeated and
sometimes contradictory in Hahnian lore (e.g., Miner & Boldt,
2002; Worsley, 1985)—he used his considerable connections and
tenuous acceptance into the British new progressive education
movement (Darling, 1981; Worsley, 1985) to found his second
school, Gordonstoun. This school likewise primarily catered to the
European aristocracy; one of many notable pupils—Prince Charles,
whose father had been a student of Hahn’s in both Germany and
Scotland—referred to Hahn’s school climate as “Colditz in kilts”
(Wilson, 2013), referencing the German WWII prisoner of war
camp. Older boys in Hahn’s school were known to physically abuse
young entrants, even by “taking a pair of pliers to their arms and
twisting until the flesh tore open” (Wilson, 2013). Other educators
at the time also noted a striking resemblance between Hahn’s
tenure as headmaster and the youth development climate of the
country he had left behind (Darling, 1981; Worsley, 1985). It was
here at Gordonstoun, just as Schule Schloss Salem was being taken
over by the German SS, that Outward Bound first started, and in
the early days it was heavily influenced by Hahn’s educational
philosophy (Freeman, 2010; Miner & Boldt, 2002), one in which
democratic, emancipatory education was of little interest (Worsley,
1985). In other words, this particular lineage of educational
programming is one of aristocratic and repressive—if not
oppressive—pedagogical practices, and its history is worth noting
when venturing into contemporary practices, wherein a sort of
hagiographic idealization of Hahn’s legacy has been more commonly accessible in the literature (e.g., Association for Experiential
Education, n.d.; Minor & Boldt, 2002).

Shifting Cultural Claims to Self
By the 1960s, ongoing social and economic revolutions in Western
culture, such as the civil rights movement and post-industrial
capitalism, were openly challenging the prewar normalization of
self-education as a nationalistic, if not militaristic endeavor, and
ushered in a more complete transition to an already-occurring
reorganization of self along individualistic terms (for an early
recognition and description of this shift, see Dewey, 1916, 1929),
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whom I will tentatively refer to as the individuated or isolated self
(cf. Michelson, 1999). This change in selfhood, experiential
learning, and youth development (referred to hereafter as ‘the
shift’) has been documented elsewhere (e.g., Armstrong, 1990;
Michelson, 1999; Millikan, 2006; Wills, 2005), and Outward
Bound’s longstanding ties to Allgemeinbildung, wherein individuals were thought to manifest innate powers which must be
tended, “and needed to be drawn out rather than put in” (Freeman, 2010, p. 32), appeared to resonate during the English-
speaking adoption of self-determination within post-industrial
capitalism (Campbell, 1987).
By the 1960s, Outward Bound was caught up in the same
trend much of the Western educational community was in: Theory
and research had been largely unsuccessful at identifying ways to
ascertain character as a stable concept simultaneously malleable
enough to be substantially influenced by a single educational
episode (Brookes, 2003; Freeman, 2010; Roberts, White, & Parker,
1974). Also, the institution-to-individual pathway of influence was
rapidly being replaced by a concept of self as uniquely and internally organized for the purposes of autonomously controlled
growth and individually arrived-at meaning (cf. Dewey, 1922;
Kaldec, 2007; Michelson, 1999). This was not a holistic replacing of
instilled for isolated, hence my use of the term shift, but should be
thought of as a prioritization of discourse. Outward Bound
continued to refer to groups of students as patrols, hearkening back
to its militaristic roots, but post-1960 literature highlighted
concepts like self-discovery above character training (Freeman,
2010). A popular manifesto at the time defined the outcomes of
American Outward Bound participation as the ability of a student
to “[reorganize] the meaning or significance of his [sic] experience
or existence and the ability to direct the course of subsequent
experience” (Walsh & Golins, 1976, p. 13) while never mentioning
Hahn. There has been a resurgence of interest in Hahn’s educational legacy over the last two decades in Outward Bound and
larger experiential education scholarship (e.g., Brookes, 2003;
James, 2000; Miner & Boldt, 2002), and the A-OB educational
environment I entered for this study appeared influenced both by
its historical legacy as well as by pseudo-contemporary discourses
in EL scholarship (see also Quay and Seaman, 2013; Vernon, 2013).
The proceeding overview of Outward Bound was necessary,
in my mind, for two reasons worth foregrounding (and others that
will remain backgrounded). First, and most important, to continue
with this paper it is worth destabilizing assumptions of a permanent, individual self transcending the curriculum and pedagogy of
this—or any—educational system. I will not be using this space to
go into philosophical discussions of a permanent certainty of self
from a subjective position (although a careful reader should be able
to discern some arguments I may put forth on that topic), but I
would point out that cultural-normative claims have and do shift,
and educational systems do potentially serve as settings where
students are taught to claim selves normalized within ideological
contours (see also Tobin, 1995), and it is the cultural-educational
self that is of interest here. Second, and related, Outward Bound
appears to have historically idealized self as either hidden-yet-
innate or autonomous-and-asocial, which logically situates
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pedagogy of self outside a sphere of academic interest and an
unnecessary reflective concept for many educators, administrators,
and researchers within the system. That is, the question of “what
type of self do we teach students to have?” may be nonsensical from
within the dominant conceptualizations, and, to me, this marks the
topic as of critical importance.
Instead, the more contemporary of the two self-concepts
espoused within individual-cognitivist models of learning and the
curricular structures they have influenced (e.g., Kolb, 1984) has
been favored by academia and is more supportive of pre-post,
outcomes-based research (in which an idealized, normative self
would be reified in objectifications). Indeed, fictionalizing a
normative self as objective variables and measuring individual
psychological markers, such as self-confidence or attitudes
through self-reported Likert-type scales, became commonly relied
upon among this educational community early on (Ewert, 1987),
and self-system changes remain the preferred foci of research (e.g.,
Beightol, Jevertson, Carter, Gray, & Gass, 2011; Hattie, Marsh, Neill,
& Richards, 1997).
Yet, simultaneously, Hahn’s Allgemeinbildung influence
appears in a number of A-OB’s institutional artifacts, most notably
a maximum often referenced and attributed as the motto of
Gordonstoun: plus est en vous, which translates literally as “there is
more in you.” That is, the other interpretation of changes to self
resulting from participation, with durable appeal to educators, is
that the innate self has been revealed and strengthened; as
described by Outward Bound:
The shirker and the leader are equally revealed. Self-control has led to
self-respect. Self-confidence has grown and life has been given a
purpose and a sense of service encouraged. Such experiences must
influence a boy’s attitude towards life and strengthen his character.
(Outward Bound Trust, 1959, p. 15)

As a counter, this study reports instead on data exploring the
organized teaching of self and other within the curriculum and
pedagogy of the Diversity Program educational setting as not
internal and subjective, but rather through references to imaginary,
cultural-normative self and other (more on this soon), and how
this shaped the potential for interaction amongst the community
members.

Research Methods, Setting, and Researcher Roles
The Diversity Program is organized, at the root, around a
normative-political claim that an egalitarian and inclusive social
existence is preferred over contemporary forms of separation and
hegemonic social structure, and further, that the educational
system can and should play a role in social re-structuring toward a
more just existence (A-OB, n.d.). Due to the foregrounded
nonobjective and otherwise political learning intentions of the
program and staff, a research practice that allows a researcher to
directly grapple with such claims is necessary to satisfactorily
understand and discuss the complexity of the educational system.
Critical ethnography (Carspecken, 1996) provides a robust
example of a nuanced approach to analyzing and articulating this
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complexity; the data presented and discussed here is drawn from a
larger study of the Diversity Program that employed this method.
I entered the ethnographic setting as an insider (see also
Holyfield & Jonas, 2003), having spent a number of years as an
educator in American OEE. In many ways this aided in my
appropriation of the role of peripheral participant and ethnographic observer (Carspecken, 1996). These educational settings
often rely on uncomfortable or otherwise jarring environments to
facilitate group cohesion and initiate holistic lifestyles of learning
for intense, short-lived periods of time, and my preexisting ease
with the transition from academic office to backpack and sleeping
bag made it easier for me to navigate the research site and setting.
That is, my understanding of the physical and psychological
requirements necessary to develop a sense of maintenance and
stability in wilderness settings allowed for added energies to be
focused on data generation as well as grasping the nuances of the
educational structure that may have otherwise been missed while
managing the distractions of biting flies, rain, heat, etc.
The methodological details of this larger study are discussed
in depth elsewhere (Vernon, in press), but it may be valuable to
contextualize certain aspects. Data for this study were generated
through observations coupled with jottings, field notes (Emerson,
Fretz, & Shaw, 1996), photographs, and oftentimes audio recordings; informal as well as semistructured interviews with students,
educators, and administrators, totaling 312 hours of direct
observation and interviewing; and institutional artifacts including lesson plans, curriculum manuals and guides, group journals,
marketing materials, and course reports. The particulars of the
educational structures (curriculum) and interactions (pedagogy)
in relation to the idealizations of and teachings of self and other
are the primary data drawn upon for this discussion. The
vignettes that follow are reconstructions of educational interactivities, in which audio-recorded dialogue (in italics) is intersected with my jottings, field notes, and analytical explications
fleshing out a full account, inviting readers to interact within and
associate with or disassociate from.
Data analyses were mainly informed by communicative
pragmatism and Carspecken’s (1996) explications of critical theory,
including the utilization of meaning field and reconstructive
horizon analyses, which are analytic practices meant to disrupt
assumptive meaning-making and explicate the otherwise implicit,
which occurs in much coding schema. That is, analyses were
marked by dialectic and recursive interplay of emic and etic.
Readers more familiar with constructivist or some generic forms of
qualitative inquiry methodology, who may be anticipating terms
like trustworthiness or saturation (see also O’Reilly & Parker, 2013),
are encouraged to seek out Carspecken’s (1996) text for a more
complete explanation of qualitative inquiry informed by critical
theory than can be satisfactorily provided in this empirical article.
I do wish to briefly highlight self as an analyzable concept.

Methodology of Self
Of the variety of analyses employed by critical researchers,
Carspecken’s (1996) exploration of meaning field and reconstructive
horizon analyses were particularly useful in discussing structural
democracy & education, vol 23, n-o 2

and interactive claims to or referent acts of self. Both analyses make
explicit that which is implicit—yet intersubjectively grasped—in
communicative acts. When communicating in understandable
manners, there are a cohort of truth claims that the actor rests her
validity on: objective, subjective, normative, and identity claims;
likewise, for a communicative act to be grasped and understood,
there must be a bracketed range of potential meanings conveyed
(Carspecken, 1996). On the surface, it would appear an exploration
of identity claims within the context of the educational setting
setting best suits the discussion of self, but this was not the case, as I
was engaging in an understanding of self as a cultural-normative
activity, rather than as a subjective reveal. In some ethnographic
research within EL settings, self and identity have been used
interchangeably (e.g., Holyfield & Fine, 1997); I wish here to briefly
draw a distinction between the two, with a more elaborate discussion being retained for a following paper.
Identities, or the labeling of I and you with specific markers, and
the meaningful interactions, roles, emotions, values, and so on that
result from these labels (e.g., Carspecken, 1996; Mead, 1934), are what
I might refer to as a meso-level construct in social sciences. Identity is
acted out in manners partially accessible to and explicable by both
actors and onlookers (although perhaps with some effort). That is,
identity claims can be grasped primarily through individual actions
and inactions yet are shaped in profoundly social and interactive
manners and point toward a macro-level self type. Self, to contrast,
has been sometimes understood as a culturally determined sense of
wholeness (e.g., Markus & Kitayama, 1991) or of one’s own symbolic
place and space in social existence as well as historically throughout a
life course (Mead, 1934). In other words, self is a concept often
relegated to either structural or subjective; more recent pragmatic
theorizations have furthered the work of Mead by drawing the
subjective into interactivity (e.g., Brandom, 1985), and I argue the
work of Mead and Brandom may be extended to a prior, systemic
self, best approached through normative claims when drawing from
Dennis’s (publishing as Korth, 2007) discussion of empirical and
imaginary:
The empirical will refer to claims that are dependent on space and
time coordinates and are, in principle, accessible to multiple witnesses
(Habermas, 1981). I will refer to these empirical claims as the discourse
of the real. The imagined will refer to the paradigmatic structures,
mental configurations, concepts, inferences, and so on that are not
constructed through a one-to-one dependence on space and time
coordinates, although the imaginary will make reference to space and
time. In other words, the imaginary is not a mere reflection of that we
presume to be real. It is something altogether different but related.
(Korth, 2007, p. 70)

Self as a learnable or appropriable construct, if we follow this logic,
may best be articulated as at first an intersubjectively idealized,
imaginary concept that is referenced or drawn upon to generate
self-like thoughts, behaviors, interactions, and so on as opposed to
subjectivities constructed through interactions or as an agency-free
cultural determinant. There may be less a ‘self ’ to define in a solely
individualized sense as much as sociocultural, normative claims or
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idealizations regarding the imagined concept of self, and thus the
use of self in coordinating and conditioning human interaction
points not toward self as a knowable ‘thing’ for individuals but
instead as an intersubjective idealization that is affirmed or
troubled by individuals and groups. Thus, it is important in an
educational setting where changes to self are intended learning
outcomes (e.g., Hattie, Marsh, Neill, & Richards, 1997) to explore
the normative claims organizing an intersubjective, culturally and
historically structured imaginary ideal of self, and the consequences of these claims as carried out in the real.
Self, then, may be placed prior to—yet is always backgrounded in discussions of—identity as a boundary object
(Wenger, 1999) between structure and lifeworld in social science, at
least within a culture and history prioritizing self (Campbell, 1987).
More specifically, self appears an intersubjective and socioculturally organized, ideological concept that then is drawn upon to
coordinate not only a sense of one’s personhood but also other and
normalized forms of social interaction. Discussions of self, within
this approach, become necessary as a discourse of cultural and
structural change toward locating and reorganizing self/other
ideologies with the goal of democratic education and participation.
This places the discussion of self as an idealized and advanced
aspect of curriculum and pedagogy in a central position when
addressing the topic of education for democracy, as was the case in
this study. It is to this end that I focus the remainder of this paper,
by providing vignettes and discussions of the manners in which we
can see this occurring in one educational setting.

The Generalized Self and Being Other
Within both the curriculum and pedagogy of the course, self was
imagined and referenced as whom I will label the owner/consumer.
The co-instructors1 as well as the curriculum they drew from both
implicitly and explicitly, although perhaps unintentionally,
presented and anticipated interactions generated by this idealized
construct. I present a series of vignettes that highlight how the
owner/consumer self was referenced during the course.

How to Be Nice and Get What You Want
June 16, 2014; 9:57 a.m. The nine students and I sit in a pine grove,
in an arc on our sleeping pads, which also double as cushions
during lessons; Katherine stands in front of us, leaning over an
imagined cooking station as if she is grilling hamburgers at a
fast-food restaurant. Dillon walks up with his shoulders pulled
forward, and is neshen in his order: Uh . . . lemmie get a veggie
burger with some special sauce . . . and some Hi-C. Katherine
responds mmhmm without looking up, and Dillon continues: and
an order of sweet potato fries.
Katherine says OK and mutters quietly while pretending to
put together Dillon’s order. She turns to face him; he has his hands
in his pockets and appears to be mimicking passivity. She reaches
out as if handing him a bag and says, OK, here’s your hamburger,
and your Hi-C, and your potato fries. That will be ten dollars. Dillon
looks toward Katherine’s outstretched hand and the imagined
1 Pseudonyms are used to provide anonymity throughout the text.
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paper bag with a disappointed appearance. This . . . uh . . . it’s uh . . .
this? Group members laugh at his failed attempt to receive the
correct food order; Katherine cheerfully retorts that yup, that looks
good! Thank you and have a nice day! Dillon reaches out and ‘takes
the bag’, turns, and walks away with a sad expression on his face.
This same act is carried out three more times; during the
second act, Dillon again does not receive his intended order but
reacts with frustration—kicking leaves and ‘storming off ’ from the
scene, leaving Katherine to, while looking confused, exclaim that
he had been a bad customer. During the third act, he postures
aggressively and angrily toward Katherine, resulting in her
‘spitting’ into his imagined hamburger before bringing it out for
him. In the fourth act, Dillon speaks carefully, checks for understanding by having the order repeated back to him as well as
double-checking on ingredients as they are brought out, and walks
away with a pleased expression. Both Katherine and Dillon sit
down, closing the arc into a circle, and Katherine brings a foldable
dry-erase whiteboard out from a bag that she carries with her for
lessons and props it up on her crossed legs.

This lesson, we’re going to call it . . . How to be nice and (emphasis hers) get what you want. Number one; someone describe Dillon’s
approach in scene one. Katherine marks off a 1, 2, 3, and 4 on the
whiteboard, and she and the students work through each, remembering Dillon’s communicative acts and what identifying labels
could be used to capture his demeanor. The four—passive,
passive-aggressive, aggressive, and assertive—were presented, as
Dillon explained to me later during an interview, as the most
common interactions between people, and ideally what we want to be
is assertive—because you’re saying what needs to be said, to who it
needs to be said, in the correct manner. And you’re not inflaming the
situation, but at the same time you’re getting what you want, OK?
With communicative assumptions drawn from the assertiveness training fad of the 1970s and early 1980s (e.g., Epstein, 1980;
Hull & Schroeder, 1979), students were presented not only with a
metaphor of the acting self as a consumer at a fast-food restaurant,
but a lesson organizing communication styles into more or less
effective tools for achieving the goals of a consuming self. The
identity typology of passive, passive-aggressive, aggressive, or
assertive offered examples of how the owner/consumer self can be
organized with various desirable and undesirable consequences.
For example, Dillon explained to the students that passivity is
unhealthy because in situations where you’re not getting what you
want, verbalizing or expressing what you want, um, it’s frustrating.
You’re disempowered. And all of us as human beings, social beings,
we all desire power—but there are appropriate ways to seek it out. Of
the four typologies of the owner/consumer self that were presented,
the first three were deconstructed by uncovering undesirable
consequences stemming from each; the passive owner/consumer’s
attempt was dismissed due to the inability to get what one wants
when constructing behaviors aligned with this objectification;
passive-aggressive suffered the same fate with the added undesirability of negative acts toward others: passive-aggressive is similar to
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passive, but demonstrating that aggression because you didn’t get
what you want—that’s negative, because [passive] is more self-
inflicted, and [passive-aggressive] is more inflicted on others,
explained Dillon. That is, the situational identity of the owner/
consumer self is to blame for the inability to obtain what is wanted
when organized as passive or passive-aggressive; however, to act
out toward others due to one’s own failure to get what one wants, as
the passive-aggressive owner/consumer does, is least desirable.
Dillon’s representation of the aggressive owner/consumer self
was able to obtain his wants, but this was coupled with the undesirable extra of spit in the hamburger, hinting at the potential for
repercussions if we do not organize an owner/consumer self that
can successfully obtain our wants without conjuring animosity in
the other. The assertive owner/consumer self was most desirable
because, as explained by Dillon, when you’re assertive, you’re
self-confident, first of all, and you’re aware of yourself, aware of what
you want, and you’re also respecting other people. This assertive
organization of the owner/consumer self simultaneously resulted in
Dillon being able to get what he wanted from Katherine while also
leaving her feeling as if she had not been harmed (cf. Woolfolk &
Dever, 1979); thus, communicating with one another “assertively”
became an educational theme for students while on course.
Where self is idealized as owner/consumer, it makes rational
sense to objectify communication and interactions as goal-
oriented; that is, to get what one wants becomes the primary
normative goal for interaction, and this becomes the reference
point for simultaneously constructing potential acts as well as
assessing the value of those acts. Alberti and Emmons (1974)
identify assertion as “behavior which enables a person to act in his
[sic] own best interest” (p. 2). This is problematic when attempting
democratic forms of participation, in which interdependence and
the ability to be both empathetic and skeptical of self and other
interests is paramount (cf. Leonardo & Porter, 2010). The assertive
owner/consumer, by being valued for successfully obtaining the
exact wants of acting self without intentionally harming other, who
is, after all—despite being a means to an end—worth protecting
from intentional symbolic or physical violence and oppression, was
the ideal self to reference and practice during the course.

Owning Symbolic Positions
Along with approaching social interaction from the perspective of
obtaining one’s own wants or advocating one’s own interests while
viewing others as a means to a personal end, the owner/consumer
self also claimed dominion over symbolic spaces and positions.
Assertiveness training was one of four communication lessons
whose progression was part of a larger curriculum on how to best
address issues of social justice in students’ lives; during the final act
of this lesson, students participated in a circle-talk (Seaman &
Rheingold, 2013), wherein each student responded to a prompted
question. Students were asked, How can you demonstrate assertiveness in your life, in one capacity or another?, opening up the
possibility of addressing the topic of assertiveness and getting what
one wants in a variety of manners. One of the most outspoken
students in the course, Sarah, offered to respond to the prompt first:
democracy & education, vol 23, n-o 2

Maybe, if you see somebody that’s getting picked on, or somebody’s just
mistreating somebody else, instead of getting really angry or mad at
them, and overdoing it [Researcher comment: because undesirable
emotional responses are for passive-aggressive or aggressive owner/
consumers], you could approach it with a balanced set of emotions
and talk to the person, maybe one-on-one, and say, “I don’t like how
you did that, I’m not mad at you, but you need to consider how they
feel and see if you would want to be treated that way.”

Sarah tactfully reorganized the discussion of identity typologies of
the owner/consumer self into a discussion of potential conflict and
injustice, but more important, because this circle-talk did not
provide the space for interaction and dialogue, she organized the
statement as an open-access, potential you, wherein the I is implied
but others are welcome to pick up or try out the statement as also
potentially theirs. This is sometimes referenced as a linguistic
shifting (Wortham, 1996)—conscious or not—of various intentions
and with various consequences; here, it supports symbolic dialogue
where it is otherwise not physically possible. It may be argued that
such a strategy obscures self by avoiding I-driven truth-claims due
to discomfort with the topic, but I argue this is more appropriately
recast as a response to a discomfort with the individuated structure
of an interaction, wherein collaborative or collective discourse is
being denied. The consequence of implying I and you as simultaneously partial occupants to a knowledge claim appears to lend
credence to this being a subtle resistance to the owner/consumer
self and normative assumption of individual spaces of reason
(Brandom, 1985). Within this statement, potential positions are
unowned and instead presented as symbolically public and
multiple-access, and this makes reference to something like a
contributing self, wherein shared access and collaboration are
normative goals. She was quickly sanctioned.
Hmm. Really quick, could you summarize that, and could you
put yourself into the context, by saying “I”? So, “I can demonstrate
assertiveness by doing (blank)?” Dillon responded. Sarah looked
confused, but then re-stated her previous comment: So, if I see
somebody getting made fun of, then I can approach the person, and
talk to them about it appropriately. Nice, said Dillon, almost
inaudible in a whisper. Sarah had now claimed dominion over her
symbolic act in such a manner as to tentatively commit to action
toward a hypothetical, future other (Brandom, 1985) while simultaneously denying current, relevant others from interacting with her
through sharing the dialogic space she had constructed earlier.
The next student responded while using the appropriate
I-language, but the following student, María, struggled to negotiate
the owner/consumer self into her response as well: I could be more
assertive by addressing it so that you can get what you need—um,
want—and you’ve gotta speak up . . .
Whereas previously Dillon had corrected Sarah’s language
toward owning her symbolic, potential positions, Katherine built
on this idea for María and the rest of the students:
I’m going to back Dillon up on the “I” statements instead of the “you”
statements. There’s this funny term that we have in our language, which
is “you”: when “you” do this, when “you” do that; that is this great way
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of taking ownership off of ourselves—own it. [Dillon: Word.] Feel the
power of saying “I can do this” instead of “I can, and then you can . . .”
So I’m going to ask you, like Dillon, to rephrase that while using “I.”

María double-checked to see if she needed to start back over from
the beginning of her response, and rephrased her statement while
referencing self as no longer a contributor to a social process but now
as owner of symbolic spaces and intentions: I can speak up for
myself—if I don’t get what I actually needed; I can just say it nicely, and
get what I want. . . . To congratulate her appropriation of self and
ownership of her statement, both Dillon and Katherine clapped
approvingly. Well said, responded Dillon, and Katherine further
reinforced María’s speech act: That was beautiful, thank you.
Brandom (1985) described a space of reason as a symbolic,
imaginary space wherein actors take stands on knowledge claims
while simultaneously justifying the potential validity of those
claims; actors lacking the ability to either justify or assent to the
commitments of such a claim—such as an infant mimicking
speech acts—are thought to be acting outside or on the periphery
of the space of reason. I argue the imagined, idealized owner/
consumer self may be thought of in a similar, referential manner,
and this space is both socially organized and policed. Further,
peripheral to the privileged space in which self was organized was
where alternative selves were referenced, such as Sarah’s and
María’s non-owning speech acts; the co-instructors’ choice to reject
their acts (and by extension, their situationally constructed
identities and referenced selves) exemplified the systemic durability of insulated, ideological commitments to a privileged—even if
imaginary—space and inability to recognize or entitle (Brandom,
1976) alternative spaces as also potentially valid or justifiable.

On Being Other: It’s Not the Place for Dissent
Discussions of self often assume self to be ubiquitous among
individuals, save when distracted or otherwise unobservant of
self-in-action (e.g., Mead, 1934). That is, it is assumed that we are all
acting and interacting as selves—the self, symbolically and socially
negotiated method and product it may be, is the option available to
an individual. One is self, surrounded by real or imagined others;
each other is in fact self to that specific person who in turn views
the former as other. Thus, when discussing self, there is an implicit
and backgrounded discourse of other of importance only because it
refers to the I-self acting toward the you-other, and vice-versa with
self and other reversed. I found this distinction unable to capture
the nuances of self-other interactions in this educational program,
primarily due to the assumption that I cannot purposefully
organize as and appropriate other, and act as I-other in response to
an acting you-self; decoupling self from I was necessary to fully
grasp the complexity of the self/other pedagogical interactions.
What I mean by this is idealized conceptualizations of self are
organized with relation to imagined, idealized others. Synchronous
with the owner/consumer self is the submissive service-provider other.
Katherine hinted at this imaginary ideal of other with her metaphoric representation as a fry-cook server to Dillon’s customer. The
other backgrounded in the discussion of Dillon’s self was a service
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provider whose job it was to, if communicated with assertively,
willingly and submissively provide the self with what it wants.
Are we practicing this [assertive, owner/consumer selves] all
alone? asked Katherine as the communication lesson came to a
close. No, replied the students and Dillon in unison. All right, said
Katherine, what is it going to take to practice it with each other? Ivan
said group effort, while Jeffrey said cooperation; Katherine had a
different idea in mind: maybe a little bit of tough skin every so often.
Hmm, nodded Dillon, as if in agreement.
So, Katherine offered, one thing you can do, if you notice anyone
having passive-aggressive behavior, you might be able to help by
saying, “Cool, Katherine, I’m noticing a little bit of passive-aggression,
and I just want to help you turn that into assertiveness. Can you try
that again?”And if someone asks, “Can I try that again?,” that means
they are using good course language [she touches her thumb and index
finger together in an ‘OK’ sign], and you can say, “Yeah! I’ve got a bit
of tough skin, and I want to help you learn.”

The self is a potential space that can be claimed and acted from, but
so also is the other; the submissive service-provider other should be
willing—should even volunteer—to be subject to repetitions of
potentially uncomfortable and/or oppressive interactions so that
the self can practice toward the idealized assertive owner/
consumer. Taking on the role of self or other was situational and
contingent on intersubjective cues, such as recognition of a
potential owner/consumer acting from within a desirable or
undesirable identity type.
While going through the circle-talk, self was a roving role
during which the student enacting self was meant to address
future, hypothetical others. The actual others in this space were,
once denied the possibility to symbolically interact with the self ’s
speech acts as these were communicatively ‘owned,’ left as passive
observers waiting for their chance to act while drawing from the
referent self. At alternate moments, such as when recognizing a
potential self-in-action, students were encouraged to submit and
volunteer to be other for the acting self. During specific educational
settings, however, students were directly instructed to be other for
an acting self.
June 18, 2014; 9:38 p.m. The students and instructors were
sitting in a circle on a mixture of gravel and grass. Katherine was
leading the students through their fourth and final communication
lesson of the course: how to give (and receive) feedback.
Ach! shouted a blindfolded Denzel as he put a clove of raw
garlic into his mouth, and the observing students laughed while
two others—Ivan and Sarah, also blindfolded—nervously and
curiously turned the garlic clove that Katherine had placed in their
hands. After they had all eaten and described the garlic, she
returned with a Skittle candy piece, much to the joy of the three
students. Both the bitter (Sarah called it sharp) and the sweet now
experienced, Katherine and the students decided that both are
necessary in life—the former in small amounts to enhance and
improve a dish, the latter a wonderful treat but not healthy in
excess. I’m gonna give you a lesson on feedback, Katherine
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continued. What do you think is the positive feedback and what do
you think is the constructive?
The structure and consequences of feedback in EE systems
have been topics that I have explored in greater depth elsewhere
(Vernon, 2013); here I wish to only focus on the roles of feedback
giver (self) and feedback receiver (other).
First of all, Katherine opined, my theory of feedback is that it’s really
feed-forward. We’re not saying, “Hey, this is what happened this week,
and you could have done this instead,” but “I noticed this, and you
could be more effective in the future if . . . it’s a gift (emphasis hers), it’s
a really cool gift; and give some Skittles, give some Skittles when you
give the garlic—sometimes I think of a garlic sandwich, so like
“Skittle-garlic-Skittle.”

The concept of feedback—or feed-forward—is organized here from
the giver’s perspective; feedback is a communicative act performed
by a self toward an other with the goal of initiating a desired
behavior change. The articulation of gift sets up a metaphor for the
potential other—the feedback receiver, who must be the willing
submissive service-provider other to appropriately accept the gift.
Again, Katherine explained:
So, with any gift, sometimes it’s a gift that you love, and you think, “Oh
my gosh, I could do wonders with that!” But sometimes you get a gift
and you’re like, “A tenth pair of socks, Grandma! Huh.” But you have
to try them on, and wiggle your toes around in them. So you’re giving
gifts to each other, and in the moment your job is to accept it. You can
ask a clarifying question if you don’t understand it, like “can you try
that again?,” but it’s not the place for dissent. And what we call that is:
honest, open, and willing.

The metaphor of a gift from one’s grandmother sets up a
cultural-normative reference to submissive acceptance out of
duty or care; you-other is not meant to disrupt the more
valuable action of me-self. Engaging in dissent or questioning
would initiate the introduction of an also-self into the interaction, hence the term ‘self-defense’, but by being other, there is
actually no you-self to defend. Katherine then double-checked
for understanding: and when you receive feedback, what do you
think you can say?
Thank you? offered María as a potential response. Thank
you! responded Katherine, in singsong agreement. Katherine
explained other logistical rules for giving feedback, many of
which were familiar to the students by this point, as they drew on
the same idealizations of self: use I-statements, be specific, etc.
After about six minutes to prepare to be a potential giver, the
co-instructors and students went around the circle, giving
feedback to the person seated on their left. I abstained from
participating and so only observed the interactions; each self
gave feedback to the other, while the other only—for every
student and co-instructor who enacted the role—responded with
thank you or a close variation (cool, thank you was Ivan’s
response, for example) before switching from other to self and
beginning the process anew.
democracy & education, vol 23, n-o 2

In one of the first research studies I designed, I conducted
in-depth interviews with co-instructors to understand the experience of co-teaching in these intense, all-encompassing environments (Vernon, 2011; Vernon & Seaman, 2012); I found reaching
back to an interview from this work helped add context to the issue
of self and other within the structure of a feedback encounter. As
one of these earlier participants from that study had shared:
I think sometimes giving [feedback] helps facilitate getting my needs
met . . . for lack of a better word, we usually give corrective feedback to
people based on things that are somehow in conflict with our way of
doing things, or in conflict with our understanding of the world or the
way something should be done. If that’s the case, then we’re giving
feedback almost in hopes that the person will take it and become more
like us or more aligned with what we view as the way . . . it’s like we
say it because we’re trying to help people do better, but help do better
relative to what, you know? We give feedback so you can improve, but
it’s like, improve on you meeting my vision of the world (laughs).

I believe this correctly identifies some of the conflict arising from
the self/other relationship in which acting selves are encouraged to,
as owner/consumer, anticipate other as submissive service-provider,
and further, wherein the submissive service-provider other is
claimed and performed by individuals in what is literally a self-
affirming cycle. In systems where the appropriation of an idealized
self and other is structurally mandated, this is even more problematic, as an unreflexive and uncritical adherence to the imaginary,
idealized forms of self and other render alternative, emancipatory
and socially just representations of self and other as illogical,
irrational, or otherwise inaccessible. Further, democratic participation relies on the assumption that individuals are capable of
contributing to a social endeavor as an acting self (e.g., Dewey,
1916), but the self/other pedagogy presented here relied on the
assumption that educators can and should intentionally manipulate students’ referent acts of self and other, thus troubling a basic
tenant in pragmatic theories of democracy.

Discussion
Of immediate impact for this particular setting and readers whose
educational and scholarly practices resonate with this discussion is
the recognition that ‘self-discovery’ is not that; self-learning was
mediated by purposeful instruction on the part of the educators,
who were drawing from an organizationally idealized curriculum
of self. Students were directed and apprenticed (Rogoff, 1993)
toward specific types of self and other, and this implicates commonly held beliefs within this educational community regarding
how educational outcomes are achieved. Given the institutional
advancements of discovery of and changes to self as anticipatable
outcomes for participants (Freeman, 2010), it should not be
surprising to see that A-OB curriculum takes an active role in
setting the conditions within which students learn to perform
approved versions of self and also learn how self is to interact with a
society of others. In other words, a mathematics course ties
expected learning outcomes directly to curriculum and pedagogy
informed by mathematics education discourse; it should be no
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surprise that an educational setting steeped in discourses of self
takes an active role in deciding what self should be and how
students should learn and demonstrate it.

Toward a Post-Mead Theory of Self
As an historical analysis, Michelson’s (1999) reasoning that the
experiential learner is isolated to inner, cognitive processes (thus
disrupting democratic, participatory learning) due to a paranoia
of outside influence appears a valid interpretation, particularly
given the psychological movement of self during the mid-20th
century (e.g., Maslow, 1943). As a contemporary analysis,
however, the organization of self in this EE setting was not
satisfactorily explained by purely extending Michelson’s line of
scholarship. What appears more reasonable is that the experiential learner (self) is built in relation with others—here the owner/
consumer and submissive service-provider. These are, I argue,
examples of a reification of capitalist economic theory as relevant
for organizing self and other, much as has already happened to
relationships (social capital), cultural interplay (cultural capital),
justifying the educational system (human capital theory), and
many other non-monetary aspects of our social existence.
Paranoia of outside influence appeared to be less of a motivation
than paranoia of symbolic material loss or missed gain, meaning
the progressive movement of experiential education has not
outpaced the post-industrial economic influence it once sought
to avoid (Dewey, 1916).
In this manner, we can also see that the self (and, we should
now realize, the other) is not, contrary to Hahnian logic, necessarily “discovered” or revealed through participation in adventure or
other forms of experience (e.g., Simmel, 1965), but is taught,
affirmed, and corrected with reference to ideological structures; yet
it is also not necessarily instilled by an outside regime in which
individuals are devoid of agency. Self is neither inherent nor
instilled; we are instead able to consider self/other conceptualizations as sites of struggle for cultural normalization or reconstruction, in which institutions, communities, and individuals labor to
make sense of social existence and the symbolic spaces for individuals, and wherein power relations regularly obstruct the
democratic potential to collectively and critically examine
conceptualizations as such.
Thus, the use of educational settings to practice embodying
self and other, while used here to unintentionally advocate a
pecuniary, capitalist self serviced by submissive others, thus
reaffirming inequality and oppressive, goal-oriented social
relations, may also be a setting for challenging social organization
toward democratic participation. The symbolic spaces these
idealizations occupy are policed and protected, but I argue are
potentially penetrable, whether through symbolic violence
(Leonardo & Porter, 2010), confusion through variation and play
(Michelson, 1999; Vernon, in press), or collective critical inquiry
(Kaldec, 2007). In other words, the structure of self-other idealizations functioned to actively mediate the conditions in which
individuals were taught to anticipate, recognize, and contribute to
the community, making this aspect of the educational setting
inseparable from, and thus a necessary addition to, any discussion
democracy & education, vol 23, n-o 2

of experiential learning and its connection with democracy or
forms of self-education.
To aid in this discourse and practice, I offer up the methodological and theoretical discussion of self and other as cultural-
normative, idealized types in which we no longer necessarily
assume self as inseparable from I, but rather locate self and other as
situationally and intersubjectively organized places and spaces of
interpretable and anticipatable relation, both potentially referenced and acted on by I or you. In other words, I argue self and
other are claimable, interdependent interactions with anticipatable
enactments (cf. Brandom, 1976). To the extent self has been
ubiquitously cast with I points toward its maintenance as a
privileged position over other, and explains how both are learned
and self is consistently claimed. That it thus becomes the struggle
to recognize you as also-self, with undergirds much in democratic
movements (e.g., Leonardo & Porter, 2010), further locates self in a
privileged position. These intersubjective idealizations are perhaps
backgrounded in many forms of communicative interaction, and
must be attended to in such a manner as to not establish multiple
selves in dialogue but rather to equalize the space between self and
other in order to negate the necessity for either, simultaneously
affording equal opportunity in both.
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